type of aggressiveness to another, as j changes (discussed in text pg. 9). Next, we justify property (b) formally, by showing that violation of (b) implies that Bn does not have consistent aggressiveness, for all j, for all finite n, thus contradicting property (a).
Justification of property (b): The following is for Bn being relatively aggressive. Similar arguments can be used for the relatively unaggressive Bn.
For relatively aggressive Bn, suppose property (b) is violated. That is, we have, for some j≥j′≥2, (j+1)℘(j) is strictly decreasing. This means that a relatively aggressive Bn satisfies (b) for j=1,...,j′-1, but violates (b) for j=j′,...,n-1, where j′≥2. Or, (j+1)℘(j)Aggr > (j+2)℘(j+1)Aggr, ∀j≥j′, which implies, 
Although ℘(j′)Aggr > ℘(j′)Neut , by comparing the two previous expressions, we find, provided the 7 holds, that ℘(m)Aggr will be less than or equal to ℘(m)Neut. This violates property (a) because here we have an aggressive bidder with ℘(m) less than or equal to that of a neutral bidder. This also makes Bn "switch" from one of the three aggressive categories to another. Observe that the aforementioned condition must hold for some m (for some finite n) since l.h.s. of the condition rapidly approaches zero (being the product of several ω js, each lying strictly between 0 and 1), and the r.h.s. of the condition is a fixed quantity less than 1 (but strictly > 0) by definition of ℘(j). Hence, violation of property (b) leads to contradiction of property (a).
Note that for generality our model is intended to accommodate the range of finite n without any arbitrary ceiling on n. For some small n, there may not be a violation of property (a). But if n is allowed to increase then eventually it becomes large enough so that such a "switch" will occur. This happens because as n increases the product of the ω js becomes even smaller so that the abovementioned condition (in the previous paragraph) holds, and the bid probability for an aggressive Bn becomes strictly less than that for a neutral Bn. While we allow different bidders to have different types of aggressiveness, note that the properties of ℘(⋅) require each bidder's behavior to belong consistently to a single type of aggressiveness across all finite n, i.e., a person who is relatively aggressive at one n, cannot become relatively neutral or unaggressive at another value of n.
It can be readily seen that the preceding approach also covers the parallel case of a relatively unaggressive Bn who violates (b) for some j′, i.e., whose ℘(j) would then eventually switch to a "neutral" or "agggressive" value of ℘(j) ≥ 1/(j+1).
For completeness of exposition we note that bidders might exist who, as j increases, cycle between satisfying and violating property (b) . Such bidders may or may not violate property (a), for some n.
Our model is not intended to cover those bidders, who have a very complex aggressiveness behavior that could only be described by a less parsimonious model.
Definition and Properties of ξ
In understanding the impact of aggressiveness on reserve and shilling strategies, our interest is in the deviation, defined as χ (j) = ℘(j) -(1/(j+1)) (text §2). When χ (j) >, {=}, [<] 0 we have relative aggressiveness, {neutrality}, and [unaggressiveness] for Bn. Note  χ (j)<1, by definition. Now consider the minimum (which is strictly >0, by definition) of the finite sequence { χ (j), j=1,...,n-1} (when χ (j)>0, ∀j); or, the maximum (which is strictly <0) of the finite sequence { χ (j), j=1,...,n-1} (when χ (j)<0, ∀j). Note that the sequence χ (j) cannot have values with mixed signs, by definition.
Define ξ as the bound (min or max), and note that it does not depend on j. Such a bound always exists because  χ (j) < 1. Since the propositions concern directional predictions w.r.t. aggressiveness, it is sufficient, and creates simpler proofs, to use ξ as the variable representing Bn's aggressiveness. (In the numerical example we use a specific functional form for ℘(j), which also gives ξ a specific functional form.)
For generality, we recognize that ξ is dependent on some parameter, representing aggressiveness in any functional form chosen for ℘(j) satisfying properties (a)-(c). Moreover, ξ can be dependent on the number of bidders, n. (The dependence of ξ on these two quantities follows, as a direct implication to the properties of ℘(j), based on which ξ is defined. In fact, ξ is a monotonic function of that parameter.) However, for notational simplicity, we write ξ without reference to those quantities, because we can do so without creating any confusion in the exposition. Whenever the dependence of ξ on such an aggressiveness parameter and/or, on n affects the proofs, we address those situations by recognizing different subcases and scenarios that this dependence might take.
Thus, ξ >, {=}, [<] 0, stands for relative aggressiveness, {neutrality}, and [unaggressiveness], for Bn.
For completeness we observe, (i) for aggressive Bn: χ (j) ≥ ξ , ∀j, with ξ >0; (ii) for unaggressive Bn:
Next, we state all lemmas together for ease of reference when reading the proofs.
Lemma 1:
(v) F n n n 1 -n 8 strictly increases as n increases and is unbounded. Proof: Let, F(v) = A⋅F(v-I), where A>1. Then, the lemma expression reduces to
The numerator is non-zero for A>1, and x>1. ∴ local maximum or minimum cannot exist.
Lemma 2:
13 strictly decreases as n increases and has a min > 0.
Proof: The lemma expression reduces to
x 15 is decreasing in x for x>1. Also, no local maximum or minimum exists. The expression is >0 everywhere; thus, the bound.
Lemma 3:
Proof: Numerator is strictly increasing and denominator is non-increasing, by definition of U(⋅).Q.E.D.
Lemma 4:
17 increases as the seller's absolute risk aversion increases.
Proof: Consider two utility functions U1(v-v0) and U2(v-v0), with the absolute risk aversion of U1 greater than that of U2. That is,
19.
This implies, (by Pratt 1964, Theorem 1 ),
The strict inequality holds if the absolute risk aversion of U1 is strictly greater than that of U2. Q.E.D.
Lemma 5:
22 strictly decreases as v increases.
Proof: By differentiating and as a consequence of Assumption 1.
Q.E.D. P(v(n) ,only) lies strictly between 0 and 1.
Proof (Lemma 6a):
From text (Section 3(i)), there are three mutually exclusive and exhaustive ways bidding can stop at s0. Their probabilities are:
Re-expressing (A1a),
Similarly, (A1b) and (A1c) can be expressed. Summing over the binomial terms we can write,
Further, for algebraic convenience we write, P1 + P2 = E1 + E2 + E3, where, ].
Also, simplification yields, P1 + P2 + P3 = E2 + E3 (note, E1 < 0).
We next derive P(v(n),only|s0) for (i) ξ =0, (ii) ξ <0, and (iii) ξ >0. Note,
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(A3) Consider E4/E2. The second term is strictly ↓ as n ↑. Thus, E4/E2 strictly ↑ as n ↑.
Consider E5/E2. The first term strictly ↑ as n ↑, by Lemma 2. The second term strictly ↓ as n ↑, by Lemma 1. Thus, E5/E2 strictly ↓ as n ↑. Cases (ii) and (iii): Bn is Relatively Unaggressive, or Aggressive, i.e., ξ ≠0. Now,
First, we show that E3/(-E1) strictly ↓ as n ↑.
Now, let F(s0+I) = A⋅F(s0), A>1. We re-write the first expression within bracket in E3/(-E1) as
Using approach similar to Lemma 1 it can be checked that this expression strictly, unboundedly ↑ as n ↑. This occurs because the continuous analog of the above expression involving n, viz.,
The second expression within bracket in E3/(-E1) can be re-written as E6 (after simplification)
Thus, as n→∞, the incremental contribution to the numerator sum in E6 decreases, while the incremental contribution to the denominator sum in E6 increases. Moreover, the numerator and denominator sums have identical number of terms. Hence, we conclude E6 ↓ as n ↑, provided
Or, the expression in E3/(-E1) without ξ , increases strictly without bound as n increases.
Next, we characterize E3/(-E1) with ξ included. Since we allow ξ to be dependent on n, we study the following two mutually exclusive and exhaustive subcases to capture types of this dependence. Subcase (a): ξ < (>) 0, can be nonincreasing (nondecreasing) in n. It follows that E3/(-E1) strictly ↓ (↑) if n ↑, since ξ < (>) 0. Note this subcase includes all instances where ξ does not depend on n.
Subcase (b): ξ < (>) 0, can be strictly increasing (decreasing) in n. First, we show, ξ ⋅(first expression within brackets in E3/(-E1)) decreases (increases) with n, for ξ < (>) 0. From E3/(-E1), we see that,
48 (as shown one-half page earlier). Now, ξ 's dependence on n can take one of two scenarios: (1) ξ depends on n for all n, (2) ξ depends on n for n≤n′, and is constant for n≥n′+1. Note that (2) occurs when max{ χ (j): j=1,...,n-1} for ξ <0, (or, min{ χ (j): j=1,...,n-1} for ξ >0) does not occcur at j=n-1, for some n. For scenario (1), ξ =℘(n-1)-(1/n).
Therefore,
, for all n≥2. The r.h.s. is nonincreasing (nondecreasing) in n by property (b) of ℘(j) for ξ < (>) 0. Using the inequality six lines before, this implies, that ξ ⋅(first expression within brackets in E3/(-E1)) is decreasing (increasing) in n since ξ < (>) 0 and we have shown already that the first expression within bracket in E3/(-E1) strictly, unboundedly increases in n. For scenario (2), the immediate preceding gives us the result for n≤n′, and for n≥n′+1, the result follows from Subcase (a) above because ξ does not depend on n for such n. Thus, throughout the range of n we obtain the result that ξ ⋅(first expression within brackets in E3/(-E1)) is decreasing (increasing) in n, for ξ < (>) 0. Now, we focus on the second expression within brackets in E3/(-E1) and for clarity treat the cases of unaggressiveness and aggressiveness separately. Case (ii) : Bn is Relatively Unaggressive, i.e., ξ <0. It can be seen that ξ ⋅(-E6) strictly decreases as n increases, because ξ and -E6 are both <0, and ξ either strictly increases in n over the entire range of n (as in Subcase (b), scenario (1)) or, ξ strictly increases in n over the relevant range of n and then remains constant (as in Subcase (b), scenario (2)), and -E6 strictly increases in n. Hence, we get that
Proofs of Propositions

Proof of Proposition 1a-1c (showing existence of vD * )
Using exposition in text, and denoting probabilities of gain and loss as Pgain , and Ploss :
From (2) in text, Absolute Expected Loss = r (v,v0,n) 
Definition 2: Define vD * ∈ Θ , as the maximum discrete bid level where, q(vD * ,v0,n) ≥ r(vD * ,v0,n) , and q(vD * +I,v0,n) < r(vD * +I,v0,n).
In order to show that such a vD * exists it is sufficient to prove the following Claim 1:
Claim 1: The functions q and r intersect each other; q starts from above and reaches below r, w.r.t. v.
Combining (i) at v=v0+I, q(⋅) > r(⋅); and (ii) at v =v, q(⋅) < r(⋅), proves Claim 1.
We first consider v as a continuous variable in [v0+I,v) and then prove the proposition for v∈ Θ .
By Claim 1, ∃ v′∈[v0+I,v) for which q(v′,v0,n) = r(v′,v0,n).
If v′∉ Θ , then subtract a δ >0 ( δ <I) from v′ which will make v′-δ ∈ Θ , and immediately below v′, for which, (using continuity of q(⋅), r(⋅), and Claim 1) q(v′-δ ,v0,n) > r(v′-δ ,v0,n), and q(v′-δ +I,v0,n) < r(v′-δ +I,v0,n). Thus, vD * is as follows:
= v′, if v′∈ Θ . From (A8), equating ratio of utilities of loss and gain to the inverse ratio of associated probabilities,
When ξ =0, to show vD * is unique for general F(⋅), choose v′ satisfying (A10). We further note that v′ in (A10) is unique because ( 
Observe that Y unboundedly strictly ↑ as n ↑, by Lemma 1; and Z strictly ↓ as n ↑, by Lemma 2. To study the behavior of ξ ⋅[Y-Z] we look at the following subcases.
Subcase ( From Proof of Lemma 1 note that,
explained earlier, ξ 's dependence on n can take one of two scenarios: (1) ξ depends on n for all n, (2) ξ depends on n for n≤n′, and is constant for n≥n′+1. For scenario (1), ξ =℘(n-1)-(1/n). Therefore, ξ ⋅(n/F(v′)) =
(1/F(v′))⋅[n℘(n-1) -1]. The r.h.s. is non-decreasing (non-increasing) in n (property (b) of ℘(j) for aggressiveness (unaggressiveness)). Using the inequality involving ξ ⋅Y four lines before, this implies that ξ ⋅Y is unboundedly increasing (decreasing) in n since ξ >0 (<0) and we have shown in Lemma 1 that Y strictly, unboundedly increases in n. For scenario (2), the immediate preceding gives us the result for n≤n′, and for n≥n′+1, the result follows from Subcase (a) above because ξ does not depend on n for such n. Thus, throughout the range of n we obtain the result that ξ ⋅Y is strictly increasing (decreasing) in n for ξ > (<) 0. Now we focus on ξ ⋅Z. For ξ > 0 and strictly decreasing (throughout the range of n as in scenario
(1), or, in the relevant range of n as in scenario (2)), ξ ⋅Z > 0, and monotonically strictly decreases with n, by Lemma 2, and hence ( ξ ⋅Y -ξ ⋅Z) strictly unboundedly increases as n increases. Similarly, for ξ < 0 and strictly increasing, ξ ⋅Z < 0, and strictly increases with n, and hence ( ξ ⋅Y -ξ ⋅Z)
unboundedly strictly decreases as n increases.
Finally, we study the impact of n on the functions q(⋅) and r(⋅), as defined in (A6) and (A7).
Let ξ > 0. It is sufficient to show v′ increases as n increases.
At v′, q(v′,v0,n) -r(v′,v0,n) = 0. Suppose n increases. As shown in the preceding, the term within bracket in (A11) increases unboundedly, implies the difference in (A11) is greater than zero (irrespective of whether the expression within bracket in (A11) is decreasing or increasing with v∈[v′-I,v′+I]). In order to make the difference equal to zero, v′ must increase to v′new>v′, since the third term in (A11) strictly ↑ as v′ ↑ (Lemma 3) and does not depend upon n. Thus, vD * newξ>0 ≥ vD * , where vD * new|ξ>0 = vD * , if v′-δ +I > v′new > v′;
≥ vD * +I, if v′new ≥ v′-δ +I.
If ξ <0, it can be similarly proved that vD * newξ<0 ≤ vD * .
If ξ =0, observe in (A11) the 2nd term is zero, and the other terms not dependent on n. Q.E.D.
Proof-Proposition 1a-1b (if ξ> (<) 0, vD * may attain any discrete bid belowv (above v0), if n is large)
We have already established above that vD * changes monotonically with n for a given sign of ξ .
Let ξ >0. By definition, vD * must satisfy q(vD * ,v0,n) ≥ r(vD * ,v0,n). At v=v, q(v,v0,n)=0, and r(v,v0,n)>0.
Thus, q(⋅) and r(⋅) must be equal at some v′ which is strictly less thanv . This in turn implies (from A9) that least upper bound (l.u.b.) of vD * will be strictly less thanv . We now establish that the l.u.b.
is indeed the highest discrete value just belowv . Consider v′ in (A10). For a given n, ∃ v′ that satisfies (A10). Since (i) the l.h.s. of (A10) is strictly >0, strictly increases as v′ increases (Lemma 3), and is finite; (ii) the r.h.s. of (A10) is strictly > 0 for v′<v; and (iii) the r.h.s. of (A10) goes to infinity as n goes to infinity (since ξ >0 -see Proof after (A11)), one can find a v′′(=v′+I) that satisfies (A10) by increasing n sufficiently to some n′′>>n. Thus, as n ↑, the maximum value of v′′ that satisfies (A10) is just belowv . By definition in (A9) l.u.b. of vD * must be the highest discrete value belowv .
When ξ <0, it can be similarly proved that vD * can attain any discrete bid level above v0. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 1d (vD * > v0 )
As already shown, at v=v0+I, q(⋅) > r(⋅). That is, v′>v0+I. Or, vD * ≥v0+I>v0. Note that if I is very large compared to (v -v0 ) we can have vD * =v0. By Def. 1, such large I is disallowed. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 1d (vD * increases with v0 )
We shall first appeal to v as a continuous variable and then establish the result for discrete reserve.
It can be checked from (A6) and (A7) by differentiating w.r.t. v0, that q(v,v0,n) and r(v,v0,n) are strictly monotonically increasing and decreasing, respectively, as v0 increases. Let v0 be increased to v0+x (0<x<I). Hold v′ as before. Then q(v′,v0+x,n) ≥ q(v′,v0,n), and r(v′,v0+x,n) < r(v′,v0,n). From (A8) we get, q(v′,v0,n) = r(v′,v0,n). Thus, q(v′,v0+x,n) > r(v′,v0+x,n). But we know from (A6) Proof of Proposition 1d (vD * ↑ as ξ ↑, for a given n)
Let ξ >0. Suppose ξ ↑ for a given n (please see "Definition and Properties of ξ " towards the beginning of the Appendix to check that ξ is also a function of an aggressiveness parameter, besides n). Then the r.h.s. in (A10) ↑. The l.h.s. needs to increase to maintain equality and the l.h.s. strictly increases in v′ (Lemma 3). Therefore, v′ increases, and so vD * new ≥ vD * (by definition of vD * , and applying Lemma 5 to first part of r.h.s. in A10). Note that, since vD * can increase only in discrete increments of I, the strict inequality must hold for sufficiently large n. This happens because, for ξ >0, the r.h.s. of (A10) strictly ↑ as n ↑, no matter whether and how ξ depends on n, as shown in discussion immediately after (A11).
Similarly, for ξ <0, it can be shown that vD * still ↑ as ξ ↑. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 1d: (vD * approaches vC * as I→0, ∀ ξ) vD * satisfies (by Definition 2): q(vD * ,v0,n) ≥ r(vD * ,v0,n).
From definition of vD * in (A9), as I→0, vD * →v′, since δ <I. Thus, in the limit as I→0, vD * satisfies the equality in (A12). In (A12), dividing both sides by I, then taking limit I→0, using (A10) and noting that the second term on the r.h.s of (A10) becomes zero, and equating we get
Since U(⋅) and F(⋅) are both differentiable everywhere, derivatives exist at (vD * -v0) for U(⋅), and at vD * for F(⋅). Since the functions are differentiable at these points, the left and the right hand limit of the functions at these points exist and are equal. Using the left-hand limit on (A13) and inverting the terms gives
This condition for optimal reserve is identical to that for optimal reserve in continuous bid auctions (Matthews, 1980, eq. 1 -using utility for zero profit is 0).
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 1d (when ξ ≤0, vD * decreases as absolute risk aversion increases)
It is sufficient to show v′ decreases as absolute risk aversion increases. At v′, q(v′,v0,n) -r(v′,v0,n) = 0. When ξ =0, (A10) gives On the other hand, let ξ increase from zero, i.e., ξ >0. As shown in end of Proof of Proposition 1a-1c vD * new,ξ>0 ≥ vD * new,ξ=0, with strict inequality holding when n is large. Hence, with aggressiveness, it is not necessary that vD * change monotonically as absolute risk aversion increases. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2a: (E[U[(πS)] at vD * , increases as ξ decreases)
First, we formulate the expression for expected utility in a discrete auction with reserve. To our knowledge this is not available in the extant literature (Rothkopf and Harstad (1994b) formulated for discrete auction without reserve.) In a discrete auction with reserve, there are three mutually exclusive and exhaustive outcomes, as follows:
(I) The item does not sell. This happens iff v(n) < v * D, with probability PI = F n (v * D). This yields π S = 0.
(II)
The item sells at v * D. This happens in three mutually exclusive and exhaustive ways: (a) Only Bn's value is ≥ vD * . With "correct foot" bidding for the reserve, the item sells at vD * . The probability of this event is:
(b) j (j≥2) bidders have vD * ≤v(i)<vD * +I, but none has v(i)≥vD * +I. The associated probability is:
(c) Only Bn's value is ≥ vD * +I, and at least one of the (n-1) remaining bidders has vD * ≤v(i)<vD * +I, and Bn has bid at vD * . The corresponding probability is:
(III) The item sells for above the reserve, due to competitive bidding. This happens in three ways for each bid level vD * +kI ≤v , for k=1,2,...,M; where M denotes the number of possible bid levels above vD * .
(a) Only Bn's value is ≥ vD * +(k+1)I, and at least one of the (n-1) remaining bidders has vD * +kI ≤ v(i) < vD * +(k+1)I, and Bn has bid at vD * +kI. The associated probability is:
(b) Only Bn's value is ≥ vD * +kI, and at least one of the (n-1) remaining bidders has vD * +(k-1)I ≤ v(i) < vD * +kI, and Bn does not have bid at vD * +(k-1)I, and so must bid vD * +kI. The probability is:
(c) Two or more bidders have vD * +kI ≤ v(i) < vD * +(k+1)I, but none has v(i)≥vD * +(k+1)I. The associated probability is:
Therefore, expected utility of seller, adding (I) through (III), is:
where M is such that vD * +MI ≤v , andv -(vD * +MI) < I.
Note that relative aggressiveness ξ affects only PII,c, PIII,a, and PIII,b. Hence, to check how E[U( π S)] changes w.r.t. ξ we need focus only on these three probabilities. Thus, we define
From Proof of Lemma 6a note that the probability P1 (see A1a) is similar to each of the probabilities PII,c (using vD * for s0) and PIII,a (using vD * +kI for s0) in here; while the probability P2 (A1b) is similar to probability PIII,b in here. From Proof of Lemma 6a further observe that both P1 (A2a), and P2 (A2b) can be written as sum of two parts, in which only one part depends on ξ . So we can rewrite,
where ζ (⋅) + η (⋅) represents the sum of two parts for each probability, respectively, with only η (⋅) dependent on ξ . As discussed in "Definition and Properties of ξ " towards the beginning of the Appendix, ξ must depend on some parameter other than n. Thus, to check how E[U( π S)]restricted varies w.r.t ξ , we hold n fixed, making ξ only a function of the aforementioned parameter. Then, taking derivative w.r.t. that parameter, indicates in which direction E[U( π S)]restricted changes with aggressiveness, as does taking derivative w.r.t. to ξ , because ξ is a monotonic function of the parameter. Also, note that we could write the parameter as an inverse function of ξ (the inverse function is well-defined because the direct function is one-to-one) and accomplish the same objective. To preserve generality and to avoid introducing an additional parameter, we derive the following by using ξ and need not refer to the other parameter. Now, differentiating w.r.t. ξ gives (noting that the terms in E[U( π S)] which are not dependent on ξ will not enter the expression below),
We borrow from the simplified expressions for P1, and P2 in (A2a-A2b) and on manipulation get:
which, after simplification yields,
The first line of the expression is strictly < 0, always, since U(⋅) is a strictly increasing function. The second line is zero because F(vD * + M I) = 1, by setting w.l.g. vD * + M I =v . This is possible because the starting point for bid levels is arbitrary, and also, beyond vD * + M I there is no relevant support of the valuation distribution.
Proof of Proposition 2b: (existence of auctions with discrete bid E[U(πS)] > continuous bid E[U(πS)])
In continuous auction, relative aggressiveness does not affect the outcomes and hence, the seller's expected utility remains unaffected. In discrete auctions, E[U( π S)] strictly ↑ as ξ ↓. Thus, as ξ ↓, the difference, E[U( π S)]discrete -E[U( π S)]continuous, strictly ↑, and can be > 0, depending upon ξ , F(⋅), v0, n, and I. This increases the set of auctions where the seller is better off with discrete than continuous bidding. We present an example of this in Section 5. Q.E.D.
Proofs of Proposition 3a-c:
The proofs examine a more general shilling strategy where shill bids can be placed one or more times in succession. First the general case is stated, and then the results are proved.
General Case of Shilling Strategies: Define a shill "run" as one or more shill bids placed consecutively by shill(s) without waiting for a response from bona fide bidders, where runs of two or more bids can be placed as in Footnote 9. Two shill runs must be separated by a bona fide bid.
Denote a sequence of shill runs by s1, s2, ..., where, the discrete bid level at which the ith shill run ends is denoted si.
Thus, si≥si-1+2I, i=1,2,... 
To compute E[U( π S)|s0], first enumerate ρ . Then enumerate the probability that all subsequent shills succeed. P(v(n),only) has been defined in (A3). We further show that the decisions where to begin and end each shill run, and the length of each run do not affect E[U( π S)|s0], provided the last shill run ends in st * . Combining all these gives the result.
Proof of Proposition 3a: (existence of st * )
By Fact 1, knowing v(n-1) fully characterizes distribution of v(n). From discussion in text (Section 3(ii)) it follows that the event { S0=s0 and v(n),only } provides the bound [s0-I,s0+I) for v(n-1). That is, either (i) s0-I≤v(n-1)<s0, or, (ii) s0≤v(n-1)<s0+I. If (i), then we know v(n)≥s0, using {S0=s0 and v(n),only}, and Fact 1.
If (ii), then we know v(n)>v(n-1), using Fact 1. To enumerate the probability ρ we condition on (i) and
(ii). Thus, we get, applying theorem of total probability, ρ = [ P( v(n)≥s1+I | {s0 and v(n),only} and s0-I≤v(n-1)<s0 ) ⋅ P( s0-I≤v(n-1)<s0 | {s0 and v(n),only} ) + P(v(n)≥s1+I | {s0 and v(n),only} and s0≤v(n-1)<s0+I ) ⋅ P( s0≤v(n-1)<s0+I | {s0 and v(n),only} ) ].
Using the characterization that v(n-1) ∈ [s0-I,s0+I), as obtained from { S0=s0 and v(n),only }, ρ = [ P( v(n)≥s1+I | {s0 and v(n),only} and s0-I≤v(n-1)<s0 ) ⋅ P( s0-I≤v(n-1)<s0 | s0-I≤v(n-1)<s0+I ) + P(v(n)≥s1+I | {s0 and v(n),only} and s0≤v(n-1)<s0+I ) ⋅ P( s0≤v(n-1)<s0+I | s0-I≤v(n-1)<s0+I) ]. Using Fact 1 and writing 1 st line of ρ to the left of the `+' sign and 2 nd line to the right in (A17), we get,
where G(⋅) and g(⋅) are the cdf and pdf of the unconditional distribution of v(n-1).
We next rewrite (A17), for ease of exposition in what follows, as
where, On integration, we get,
If the shill run s1 succeeds, the probability that s2 succeeds, where s2≥s1+2I, is
noting, if first shill run succeeds then remaining bidder has v(n) with probability one, by text Sec.
3(iii).
The expected utility of shilling with terminal shill st * does not depend on the intermediate shills. Solving for st * . We consider the objective function J(⋅) in (A21) as a function of a continuous variable y, and then establish the result for st * ∈ Θ .
Call J(y-I) = P(v(n),only) [1 -F(y)] H(s0) U(y-v0). Note that at y=st+I, (A21) follows. We find y=y * which maximizes J(y-I) such that J(y * -I)>U(s0-v0), where y * is the continuous equivalent of st * +I, not that of st * . Simplifying the f.o.c. such a y * , if exists, satisfies
Assumption 1 and definition of F(v) and U(⋅) assures y * in (A23) is unique.
If y * ∉ Θ , then search for st * on the discrete bid levels immediately below and above y * . In doing so, we can find, by continuity and strict concavity of J(⋅), a δ >0 ( δ <I), which will make y * -δ ∈ Θ . Note y *δ is the discrete bid level immediately below y * . To construct st * , we make use of the fact the seller wants the bidder to have the bid which maximizes E[U( π S)|s0], so the seller would shill up to one interval lower. Thus, subject to satisfying (A22), we get: Remark 1: Note that vC * = st * +I, provided vC * ∈ Θ . This follows by observing the equivalence between (A23) and equation (1) of Matthews (1980) .
Proof of Proposition 3b (st * does not depend on s0)
As shown above.
Proof of Proposition 3b (st * does not depend on ξ)
As can be seen by observing (A23) and (A24).
Proof of Proposition 3b (st * does not depend on n)
Follows from definition of st * in (A24) and because y * does not depend upon n from (A23).
Proof of Proposition 3b (st * increases with v0)
We first show y * ↑ with v0, using Assumption 1, U′>0, and U″≤0. After some simplification we get Call y * at v0+x, as y * new which is strictly greater than y * . Thus, st,new * ≥ st * .
Proof of Proposition 3b (st * decreases as absolute risk aversion increases)
By definition of absolute risk aversion in proof of Lemma 4, and using Theorem (1) Pratt (1964),
By Assumption 1, the r.h.s. of (A23) is strictly ↑ in y * . We show that the l.h.s. is ↓ in y * . Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3c: (comparing st * +I with vD * )
Let ξ =0. Keep v′ and y * as continuous analog of vD * , and st * , respectively. Without loss of generality, let {v′,y * }∈ Θ . For reserve auction, using the continuous analog of (A10) means taking the limit of I→0, which gives the condition
86 for optimal reserve. This is exactly same as }, and {v _ ≤ {v(1), ... , v(n-2)} < s0+I }. Further, ex-ante, the set of possible decisions (accept or reject bids) the seller can make is identical in both auctions. Also note that the bidders' ex-ante set of decisions remains unchanged from reserve to shilling (bidders don't change their bidding strategy during auction, as stated in text Section 3). Hence, the seller can never be worse off by using optimal shilling compared to using optimal reserve (appealing to Blackwell's Theorem on Comparison of Experiments, 1951) .
We now show that auctions exist where, ex-ante, the seller is strictly better off with optimal shilling than with optimal reserve. By Blackwell's Theorem, E[U( π S)] is strictly higher in the shilling auction when:
(i) st * +I≠vD * , and, (ii) if st * +I=vD * , and it is optimal for the seller to not shill for at least one s0 < st * (by Proposition 4 such auctions exist).
In (i), shilling and reserve strategies yield different optimal lowest acceptable bids and hence different expected utilities for the seller. In (ii), optimal shilling is strictly dominating for the seller because the seller accepts at least one s0 with shilling (based on more information) that he rejects with reserve, and he accepts that s0 because the seller's expected utility is greater from accepting s0 rather than shilling up to st * . Now, the expected utility for the latter is the same as that from setting vD = vD * in the optimal reserve scenario, since vD * =st * +I. Thereby, the seller's expected utility is strictly higher with optimal shilling. If st * +I=vD * and the seller shills for all s0<st * , then seller is as well off as in reserve auction.
Proof of Proposition 5b: (bidder better off, thus, Pareto dominance of shilling over reserve) (i) When ξ >0, consider shilling auctions with st * +I<vD * (per Proposition 3c). The probability the item sells is strictly greater with shilling than with reserve. Also, ex ante each bona fide bidder's expected surplus is greater in such shilling auction, because (i) with probability > 0, property would sell at some bid < vD * in shilling auction, and (ii) P(any bidder's value ≥ st * +I) > P(bidder's value ≥ vD * ), since st * +I < vD * .
(ii) When ξ ≤0, consider shilling auction with st * +I=vD * . Using Proposition 4 and the arguments we have just stated in the proof of Proposition 5a, we conclude that auctions exist in which bidders are strictly better off (unless seller shills for all s0≤st * , in which case the bidders are as well off as in reserve auction.) By Proposition 5a, the seller is at least as well off with shilling. Pareto dominance follows.
